A cumulative emissions approach is increasingly used to inform mitigation policy. However, there are different interpretations of what '2°C' implies. Here it is argued that cost-optimisation models, commonly used to inform policy, typically underplay the urgency of 2°C mitigation. The alignment within many scenarios of optimistic assumptions on negative emissions technologies (NETs), with implausibly early peak emission dates and incremental short-term mitigation, delivers outcomes commensurate with 2°C commitments. In contrast, considering equity and socio-technical barriers to change, suggests a more challenging short-term agenda. To understand these different interpretations, short-term CO 2 trends of the largest CO 2 emitters, are assessed in relation to a constrained CO 2 budget, coupled with a 'what if' assumption that negative emissions technologies fail at scale. The outcomes raise profound questions around high-level framings of mitigation policy. The paper concludes that applying even weak equity criteria, challenges the feasibility of maintaining a 50% chance of avoiding 2°C without urgent mitigation efforts in the short-term. This highlights a need for greater engagement with: (1) the equity dimension of the Paris Agreement, (2) the sensitivity of constrained carbon budgets to short-term trends and (3) the climate risks for society posed by an almost ubiquitous inclusion of NETs within 2°C scenarios.
Introduction
When establishing measures to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions at national and even subnational scales that are aligned with the Paris Agreement, policymakers are informed, either directly or indirectly, by CO 2 pathways derived from academic research. It is therefore essential that such pathways evolve from a diverse range of inputs and relationships as well as capture differing national circumstances. Yet what is clearly evident is that the analyses informing national energy decision making is dominated by a significant reliance on the large-scale and global implementation of negative emissions technologies (NETs). In theory such technologies effectively increase the available carbon budget and thereby reduce the rates of actual mitigation of CO 2 emissions necessary to deliver on the Paris 2°C commitment. Certainly such NETs-based scenarios should be considered as a theoretical possibility. However, and as a complement to the wealth of scenarios with NETs, this paper eschews their widespread deployment as technically too speculative, uncertain in terms of efficacy and feedbacks, and with critical issues on the scale and scope of available biomass inadequately understood (Gough & Vaughan, 2015; Mann, 2009 ).
Building on Anderson and Bows (2011) , the analysis explores the implications of near-term CO 2 trajectories of the biggest emitters for delivering on the 2°C commitment. Using a cumulative emissions framing, the paper highlights how the existing literature typically under represents sociotechnical opportunities for near-term mitigation, and in so doing significantly elevates the risk of potentially irreversible damage to the climate system. Cumulative emissions and climate sensitivity dictate future temperatures (Allen et al., 2009 ). Both are important for communicating implications of climate science to decision-makers.
'Cumulative emissions' refers to the stock of greenhouse gas emissions that can be released into the atmosphere over time, for a given probability of a change in global mean surface temperature, while climate sensitivity is the temperature change associated with doubling atmospheric CO 2 concentration compared with pre-industrial levels. The transient climate response is the temperature rise above pre-industrial levels induced when CO 2 concentration doubles following a 1% increase in concentration each year. The equilibrium climate sensitivity describes the stabilised temperature at equilibrium, following a sustained long-term doubling of CO 2 concentration.
Uncertainty in either leads to uncertainty in the cumulative emissions associated with future temperatures. The likely (>66% probability) range for the transient climate response is 1.0°C to 2.5°C (IPCC, 2013) and 1.5°C to 4.5°C for the equilibrium climate sensitivity, although some studies challenge these ranges (Hansen et al., 2013; Sherwood et al., 2014) . It is feasible that temperature changes could be higher, although current consensus is that the empirically measured temperature response makes such changes less likely (Otto et al., 2013) .
The transient climate response to cumulative carbon emissions (TCRE) is the global mean surface temperature change for every 3670 GtCO 2 (1000GtC) 1 emitted, and provides a preferential measure of the warming response to CO 2 when radiative forcing varies over decadal timescales . Its likely range is 0.8°C to 2.5°C (pp. 17, IPCC 2013) and important in determining cumulative budgets associated with 2°C. However, even within the IPCC's Fifth Assessment Report (AR5), including 'summaries for policymakers' (SPM), there remains substantial room for misunderstanding. Table A-1 draws attention to the assorted means by which emissions associated with temperature change are communicated, a point made by Rogelj, Schaeffer, et al. (2016) . A variety of units, timeframes and probabilities are used throughout AR5
to present a 2°C carbon budget. There are differences in how probabilities of exceeding 2°C are presented: qualitatively (likely, etc.), approximate ranges (>50%, etc.) and precise ranges and units (e.g. GtC, PgC) vary within and across reports, and different budgets for the same probabilities of staying below 2°C. This variety partly arises from some results being generated by CMIP5 ESM (Coupled Model Inter-comparison Project Phase 5, Earth System Models) ensemble using four
Representative Concentration Pathways, with others generated by Integrated Assessment Models (IAMs) using several hundreds of scenarios. Clarity is further hindered by the treatment of non-CO 2 forcings. Such a minefield of potentially confusing information obstructs informed critique by policymakers of the mitigation scenarios forthcoming from the community, and therefore of the scope, scale and deployment rates of energy supply and demand socio-technical options.
Given the implications of exceeding 2°C, there is a responsibility on academics to adhere to scientific evidence and provide clarity for decision makers. Yet when scrutinising the solution space presented, it can be argued that the community not only offers confusing information, but subjectively chooses to give greater credence to some options -such as extensive deployment of negative emission technologies (NETs) -over others. 
Methods
Applying a carbon budget framing highlights the importance of delivering high (>4% p.a.) mitigation rates and curbing emissions within a plausibly short timeframe (Anderson & Bows, 2011; Rogelj et al., 2010) . By contrast, 2°C IAM scenarios typically output global mitigation rates of 2-4% p.a., sometimes made possible by global emissions peaking in 2010 and routinely before 2020 (Anderson, 2015; UNEP, 2014) . Moreover, for all scenarios in the IPCC database with a >50% chance of avoiding 2°C, and 'policy delay' to 2020, 'negative emissions' through technologies such as bioenergy with carbon capture and storage (BECCS) are assumed to play a critical role (Anderson, 2015; Gough & Vaughan, 2015; Rogelj et al., 2011; UNEP, 2014; van Vuuren et al., 2011) . Whilst some IAM studies draw attention to the importance for avoiding 2°C of long-term technological availability (Vliet et al., 2013) , cost-optimal frameworks point to the alternatives as being simply an issue of technology, cost and potential. They fail to sufficiently address social aspects of technology change (Ackerman et al., 2009) , an issue of deep importance when considering social acceptability in futures with extensive BECCS deployment (Braun et al., 2017; Fuss et al., 2014; Gough & Vaughan, 2015) . Whilst technical efficiency plays a role in IAMs, they are ill-equipped or designed to deliver solutions with substantial socioeconomic/demand-side change. Specifically, their economic foundations are mostly based on traditional equilibrium models that cannot capture the complexity of social systems and emergent behavioural patterns (Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013) . Thus, current IAM outputs risk delivering overly optimistic, unrealistic and potentially flawed messages about future change (Moss et al., 2001 ).
This is problematic given their dominance in the literature, underpinning a common view that challenging, but incremental energy policy is sufficient to deliver on the Paris Agreement.
Grouping 'big emitters'
With over 80% of global CO 2 emissions from energy and industry emitted by 25 nations, the largest CO 2 contributors -'big emitters', are clustered by energy and macro-economic characteristics. Each group's energy and development context is considered, enabling assessment of the sensitivity of decarbonisation rates to short-term inertia and lock-in. While some analyses recognise the importance of approaches grounded in a practical understanding of social, technical and economic factors (for instance, Deetman et al., 2015) , here significant attention is paid to nearterm (typically ~5 year) trends. The results present a complementary perspective to the existing literature.
To derive big emitter groups, territorial and consumption-based CO 2 emission inventories were scrutinised to rank nations (Le Quéré et al., 2014) . Under both consumption and territorial accounts, the big emitter countries are the same, and contribute over 80% of global emissions (and 65% of the population). They are:
Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Iran, Italy, Japan, Kazakhstan, Mexico, Poland, Russia, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, UK, Ukraine and USA.
To build a contextual understanding of these nations, absolute and relative characteristics of energy systems including levels and rates of GDP/per capita, CO 2 intensity of energy consumption etc., were compared. These Kaya-type indicators reflect social, economic and environmental aspects of sustainability allowing countries and groups of countries to be assessed in terms of energy system demand-and supply-side characteristics, contextualising trends in annual CO 2 Fuel use from international aviation and shipping ('bunkers') is unaccounted for within national budgets. With over 3% of global CO 2 in 2014 (some sources suggest 5%, with ~3% from shipping (Smith et al., 2015) ), a share anticipated to grow (Bows-Larkin, 2014) 
Developing scenario pathways
The 2°C framing of climate change has emerged as a scientifically informed, but ultimately political 'anchor point' (Jordan et al., 2013 ) associated with carbon budgets. This was reinforced by the Paris Agreement, with the additional qualifier of "well below 2°C", arguably implying a probability of a greater than 50% chance. The emission pathways developed here are premised on budgets constrained by a 50% or 66% probability of avoiding 2°C.
Whilst deforestation emissions are subject to large uncertainties (Houghton et al., 2012; Jain et al., 2013; Le Quéré et al., 2015; Saatchi et al., 2011) it is important to estimate twenty-first century cumulative deforestation emissions to determine the remaining CO 2 budget. Here, CO 2 -only budgets used are from the AR5 Synthesis SPM (IPCC, 2014b). Acknowledging debate over greenhouse gas emissions associated with agriculture and non-CO 2 forcers (BowsLarkin et al., 2014; Calvin et al., 2013; Joeri et al., 2015; Kyle et al., 2014) , the figures used are:
>50% of 2°C, 3000 GtCO 2 6 ; >66% 2900 GtCO 2 7 , updating similar analysis (Anderson & Bows, 2011; Anderson et al., 2008; Bows et al., 2006) . Emissions between the 1860-80 mean and 2014
(Le Quéré et al., 2015) , along with those from deforestation (Houghton et al., 2012) , are removed to leave a CO 2 -only budget for energy and industry from 2015 to 2100: >50%, 898 GtCO 2 ; >66%, 798 GtCO 2 , consistent with Rogelj, Schaeffer, et al. (2016) . Whilst a next step could allocate shares of the budget to each big emitter, as in Raupach et al. (2014) , here the focus is on developing pathways using each group's short-term CO 2 trend, and subsequently 'backcasting' reduction rates to remain within budget. Recognising the range of burden-sharing frameworks (Höhne et al., 2014; IPCC, 2014a; Raupach et al., 2014 ) a very constrained carbon budget raises the question of whether a formal burden-sharing regime for 2°C remains viable (Sharmina et al., 2015) . This study takes a pragmatic approach, contextualising short-term trends within the global budget available.
Analysis
Three families of scenarios are designed to illustrate the sensitivity of a constrained carbon budget to short-term emission trends of big emitters, when annual CO 2 emissions remain above zero.
Consequently, none of the scenarios assume explicit inclusion of NETs to contrast with the majority of 2°C scenarios in the literature 8 . The 'Sustain' pathway family represents a highly inequitable world successfully recovering from the economic downturn, with limited efforts to implement new mitigation policy prior to 2020. Quantitatively, groups sustain post-recession (2009) (2010) (2011) (2012) (2013) (2014) rates to 2020, decreasing by 1 percentage point p.a. until reaching a peak in emissions (e.g. a 2% rate in 2020 reduces to 1% in the following year, and peaks the year after). Post-peak, the mitigation rate increases year-on-year to the maximum necessary to remain within budget.
These pathways are similar to the 'Policy Start in 2020', Figure A-4) .
Even in the Development scenario (Development, Figure A-5) , the distribution of cumulative emissions is disproportionately weighted towards wealthier and rapidly industrialising nations. India's 2050 emissions are below 0.6 tCO 2 per person, demonstrating a need to take a much lower-carbon development route than taken by industrialised nations (Lamb & Rao, 2015) .
All pathways explicitly require industrialising nations to 'leapfrog' carbon intensive development.
Discussion
All scenario pathways illustrated have sustained CO 2 reductions that exceed the 4% p.a. rate typical of 2°C scenarios in the literature, but consistent with budget-focused analysis of Raupach et al.
(2014) and Peters et al. (2015) . This divergence arises from three principal factors.
First, all IAM scenarios within the IPCC scenario database for a >50% chance of avoiding 2°C and with a policy delay to 2020, expand the available budget through the large-scale uptake of NETs, specifically BECCS (Gough & Vaughan, 2015) . As Peters (2016) . The absence of robust operating costs for a CCS power station, let alone BECCS, also raises concerns given that it is repeatedly found to be a key least-cost policy option in many scenarios.
Second, the potential for socio-technical and socio-economic change to deliver reductions in energy consumption in the near term is something IAMs are ill-equipped to model given their conventional economic frameworks, assumptions and failure to reflect the path-dependent nature of technical change (Ackerman et al., 2009; Pahl-Wostl et al., 2013; Stern, 2016) . Third, the inertia constraining the rate of transition to low-carbon energy supply is characterised here by focusing on the dynamics of short-term trends, postulating a mix of both challenging but deliverable, and theoretical changes to these trends.
The essential characteristics of the scenarios draw particular attention to the importance of existing levels of CO 2 , and near-term CO 2 growth rates. The groups whose recent emissions rates differ by more than 1% compared with historical rates (Table 2) are Japan and Russia. In Japan's case, emissions are expected to rise at a higher rate than pre-2011, if it continues to move away from nuclear (Crastan, 2014; Huang & Nagasaka, 2012) . For Russia, falling oil prices linked to increased production from OPEC and Russia, rising consumption of indigenous shale oil in the USA influencing trade, and a highly volatile Russian economy (Connolly, 2015; Korppoo & Kokorin, 2017; Russell, 2015) all add to uncertainty around Russia's CO 2 trends.
How China's shifting economy impacts on CO 2 growth is a key source of uncertainty. With nearly 30% of global CO 2 from fossil fuel and industry, any short-term change in China's CO 2 growth rate has a significant impact on mitigation rates required by all. Recent developments, such as China's reduction in coal consumption, have already influenced global CO 2 growth (Qi et al., 2016) . A critical issue, is the possibility that data for China for 2000 to 2013 may have underestimated cumulative emissions by nearly 11GtCO 2 (Liu et al., 2015) and that Chinese energy statistics are frequently found to contain large anomalies (Korsbakken et al., 2016) . Moreover, many IAMs fail to capture near-term issues adequately, as they often involve ten year time-steps and use modelled, rather than empirical, 2010-to-present data.
India's recent growth rate continued at the 1990 to 2014 average despite the global economic downturn. Its emissions grew by 6% between 2013 and 2014 and 5% 2014-2015, dominating the marginal increase in global emissions. With rising demand for fossil fuels, and India's very low per-capita CO 2 , its growth rates might not be expected to fall for at least a decade.
India's recent Environment Minister suggested emissions will not peak before 2045, given the need to focus on poverty eradication (Davenport, 2014 Whilst not a 'country group', international aviation and shipping, (bunkers) are assumed to undertake urgent and rapid decarbonisation. This is in contrast to expectations and their exclusion from the Paris Agreement. Stakeholders representing aviation and shipping generally assume that their industries will become net purchasers of emissions rights from others, (Bows-Larkin, 2014 ).
This position was reinforced by an International Civil Aviation Organisation agreement to implement its Carbon Offsetting and Reduction Scheme for International Aviation (CORSIA) to
"address any annual increase in total CO 2 from international civil aviation", (ICAO, 2016 ). The analysis here shows that, as a big emitter, emissions from bunker fuels are highly influential.
Consequently, there is a clear imperative for this sector to urgently deliver absolute mitigation.
Virtually all nations submitted NDCs for the 2015 Paris COP 21 meeting. These NDCs, alongside broader energy contexts, are built on (Table 2) Considering the pathways generated here, what stands out is that even a weak consideration of equity 11 (i.e. the Development scenario), leaves the 66% chance of avoiding 2°C as arguably infeasible 12 A similar conclusion can be drawn for the 50% probability of avoiding 2°C, given 11% p.a. reductions would require unprecedented whole-system change. If no allowance is made for equity, the 66% chance of avoiding 2°C is only achievable with a program of deep and immediate mitigation. The Paris Agreement makes no provision for significant pre-2020 efforts. If postrecession emission rates for each country-group continue until 2020, remaining within the 50% budget is practicable, but only with global mitigation rates by 2025 well beyond the aggregated NDCs submitted to the Paris COP. Put simply, failure of the international community to deliver immediate (pre-2020), deep and absolute mitigation from the big emitters, will effectively put the carbon budgets for "well below" 2°C (or "likely" 66%-100%, chance) beyond reach, unless NETs are both proved viable at scale and urgently deployed. Table 2 : Comparison between growth/decline rates across groups. Colour code indicates low growth or a reduction: G1, G3, G5, G10; low-medium growth: G8, G9, RoW; medium growth: G2, Bunkers; medium-high growth: G4, G6 and G7. 
Conclusions
This paper analyses recent emission trends of big emitting nations, and of the aviation and shipping sectors, and considers these in relation to energy system characteristics, technical, social and political inertia, and issues of development. The analysis explicitly eschews widespread use of NETs, both because there are many major and potentially insurmountable obstacles to their successful uptake at scale (Brack, 2017; Fuss et al., 2016; International Energy Agency, 2016; Smith & Torn, 2013; Vaughan & Gough, 2016) , and to provide a complement to the wealth of scenarios that do include them.
Bringing together this analysis with the IPCC's carbon budgets leads to challenging and uncomfortable conclusions. First, the on-going failure of any 'big emitter' to begin a comprehensive and rapid transition of its energy systems, suggests that constraining emissions to a carbon budget with a greater than 66% chance of avoiding 2°C, if applying even weak equity criteria, is now infeasible 12 (with the NETs caveat as outlined). A similar conclusion arises for the 50% budget (and again assuming that NETs fails at scale). In essence, there exists a conflict within the Paris Agreement between its temperature and equity commitments.
Whilst big emitting nations and international aviation and shipping are pivotal to delivering early and global-scale mitigation, overlooking how emissions may rise as other nations necessarily improve their standards of well-being would be a mistake. It is clear that rapidly industrialising nations need to leapfrog the high-carbon infrastructures of their industrialised counterparts, and establish low-carbon alternatives from the outset.
In 2016, global CO 2 emissions were ~60% higher than they were at the time of the IPCC's first report in 1990. Despite a quarter of a century of repeated scientific evidence, there has been limited success in delivering meaningful levels of absolute mitigation. Against this backdrop, and with the successful adoption of the Paris Agreement, it is essential that the academic community captures the breadth of opportunities for constraining emissions within carbon budgets associated with "well below 2°C" and, ideally, "pursuing … 1.5°C". Whilst suites of 2°C scenarios exist in the literature, the IAM approach typically underplays the scope and importance of nearterm mitigation and in particular the socio-technical opportunities for reducing energy demand as a way to reduce mitigation rates in later years (Anderson & Bows, 2011; Anderson & Peters, 2016) . The pathways presented in this paper pay greater attention to these issues and the inertia of existing energy-systems Otto et al., 2013; Pfeiffer et al., 2016; Rogelj, den Elzen, et al., 2016) 2 Taiwan is included in China due to the aggregation of economic indicators for this region.
3 Statistical clustering employed provided no more robust a grouping system than comparison and expert judgment. 4 A gap not greater than 1, where 1 is the difference between two nations if all nations were to be ranked in order across each indicator.
5 More information on the clustering method available in the Appendix. 6 A range of 2900-3200 GtCO 2 depending on non-CO 2 drivers.
7 A range of 2550-3150 GtCO 2 depending on non-CO 2 drivers.
8 Mitigation technologies or approaches are not specified in the pathways, so in theory some negative emissions technologies could be providing a reduction in absolute CO 2 emissions, but not sufficient to take the pathway below zero.
9 Based on a conversion efficiency of 35% (net of the CCS process), using BECCS primary energy data in Fuss et al. (2016) and background data provided by a co-author. 10 The NDCs formulated in either CO 2 and other GHGs separately, or CO 2 equivalent.
Assumptions for CO 2 are either derived directly from information provided, or interpreted using analysis by the Climate Action Tracker, 2015.
11 This is an area where different equity principles (Bretschger, 2013 ) and interpretations of fairness give different outcomes for carbon budget allocations. However, the Paris Agreement draws particular attention to the importance of ethical issues such as equity and how poorer nations will need a significant grace period to decarbonise energy systems.
Specifically, "peaking will take longer for developing country Parties" (Paris Agreement, Article 4.1). However as Anderson and Bows (2011) note, even when allowance is made for a delay, current significant differences in CO 2 per capita between wealthy and poorer nations still leaves cumulative emissions per capita within 2°C scenarios larger in wealthier nations.
Here, the specific text "weak consideration of equity" refers to the Development scenario where poorer groups reach a peak in CO 2 at a later date than the other groups ( Figure A-5 ).
12 What is or isn't feasible is subjective. Here 'infeasible' is specifically defined as long-run mitigation of over 10% p.a. Whilst such mitigation has not been delivered in practice, and is twice that following the economic breakup of the Soviet Union, provisional work suggests a combination of supply and demand technologies, allied with policies on behaviour and practices, could deliver mitigation rates of up to 10% p.a. Watson et al., 2014) . 
